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Hare the Economic Contradictions 
of Capitalism been Solved?
M A R X  SHOW ED tha t there was a basic contradiction between 
social production and the private (capitalist) ownership of the means 
of production and of the product. A s a result of this contradiction, 
in the long run the social relations betw een workers and capitalists 
become a barrier to  the development of the productive forces. The 
1929-39 economic crisis and depression was seen by many as estab­
lishing M arx’s basic proposition beyond any reasonable doubt.
In  the last 30 years, however, there have been increases in the 
living standards o f the m ajority of people in countries with 
developed economies. There have been rapid rates of growth in 
countries such as Japan  and W est G erm any. Since M arx’s time, 
among the basic changes that have taken place have been a growth 
of m onopoly, new forms of im perialism  and a growth of the 
governm ental sector and state controls in the economy. Keynes’ 
General Theory (1936) gave a theoretical base for the growth of 
the public sector and controls, seen by him  as necessary for the 
continuance of capitalism. D o these developments m ean that the 
M arxist analysis is dated? C an we expect a long period of growth 
under capitalism ?
It is often argued that the task  of regulating the economy is 
m ade easier by the creation of “consum er societies.” A cceptance 
of stability and growing affluence underlies the view held by some 
that the working class has been integrated into the capitalist system, 
and that for revolutionary change we m ust look to  forces outside 
the norm al em ployer-worker relations. T he central question to  be 
discussed here is: “H as the m odern m onopoly-im perialist State 
solved the economic problems of capitalism ?”
GROWTH OF SURPLUS: PROPENSITY TO CONSUME
M odern marxists, such as Sweezy, base their analysis on the 
growth of surplus. A s an extreme case of m onopoly, the B H P 
illustrates why surplus grows with m onopoly capitalism  —  as a 
monopoly B H P is. a price m aker. I t  has the resources to  reduce 
costs. In  these conditions the growth of surplus is inevitable. One
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way of regarding the question of the share of the working people 
in the product is to  ask: “W hat are the trends in the propensity 
to consume?” * Because of its class character, a m ature capitalist 
economy has two basic trends —  surplus and productive capacity 
tend to  expand rapidly, while on the other hand the long-term 
trend of the propensity to  consume is for it to  decline.
A. The Propensity to Consume
Keynes thought it probable that in wealthy countries the 
propensity to  consum e would fall as income rose. I  believe that 
the tables below illustrate a law of development of the industrialised 
capitalist countries studied, which can be stated in these terms: 
in general, and in the long-run, as income grows the propensity 
to consume declines. Because of the im portance of consum ption 
this is one m ajor reason for the long-term instability of a capitalist 
economy.
T A B L E  1: Showing trends in the propensity to consum e.
(a) U SA1
Gross National Consumption Propensity to Consume =
C 100
X
Year Product (GNP) $ Thousand
(C)
Thousand
millions millions GNP 1
1929 103.1 77.2 74.8%
1939 90.5 66.8 73.8
1949 256.5 176.8 68.9
1959 483.7 311.2 66.6
1968 865.7 536.6 61.9
1969 932.1 576.0 61.7
This means tha t consum ption absorbed 74.8%  of U SA’s GNP 
in 1929; consum ption absorbed 61.7%  of G N P in 1969.
(b) England2
Year
GNP 
£ Thousand
(C)
£ Thousand Propensity
millions millions consume
1938 5.2 4.4 84.9%
1948 10.5 8.6 81.8
1958 20.4 15.4 75.3
1966 32.4 24.1 74.2
* The propensity to consume is the proportion of incomc or product that goes 
to consumption. Keynes first used the term. Consumption is seen here as 
depending primarily on the level of income and the distribution of income.
1 See Heilbroner: Understanding Macroeconomics pp. 20-23. Later figures from 
US Current Business Statistics March 1970.
2 English National Income and Expenditure 1967, pp. 220-3.
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(c) A ustralia3 
Year
GNp 
$ Thousand 
millions
(C)
$ Thousand 
millions
Propensity to 
consume
1938-39
1948-49
1958-59
1968-69
1969-70
1.8
4.5
12.5
27.1
30.2
1.3
2.9
8.0
15.7
17.4
70.3%
64.6 
64.0 
57.8
57.6
(d) Jap an 4 
Year
GNP 
Thousands of 
millions of Yen
(C)
Thousands of 
millions of Yen
Propensity to 
consume
1954
1958
1962
1968
7,792
11,342
20,863
52,780
5,087
6,891
11,417
27,478
65.2%
60.8
54.7
52.0
One finds periods when income is rising bu t propensity to  
consume changes very little, e.g. A ustralia 1948-49 to  1958-59; 
USA 1951-1964. B ut the long-term trend —  pre-1939 com pared 
with the present time, is quite clear.
I t  follows that before 1939 in the first three countries studied, 
about threequarters of the product went to  the consumer. Today, 
the proportion is down to three-fifths and it is still falling. In 
Japan  just over half of the product goes to  the consumer. While 
there have been vast increases in the levels of consum ption in the 
countries studied, the proportion of the product going to  consum p­
tion has declined. In  view of the key role of consum ption we 
now have to  examine how is it possible to  have had:
•  Increases in surplus and in productive capacity.
•  A  decline in the propensity to  consum e over the same period 
and m uch lower levels of unem ploym ent com pared with the
B. Factors off-setting the fall in the Propensity to Consume
The product must be sold. The question thus becomes: In  which
» Australian National Income and Expenditure 1954-55, 1962-63. 1968-69, and 
1 *>70-71.
* Japanese Statistical Year Book 1968 p. 501 and 1969 p. 491.
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1930’s.
direction has spending increased since 1939 to compensate for 
the higher productive capacity and the fall in the propensity to 
consume? There m ust be an off-setting factor or the capitalist 
world would be plunged into m ass unemployment. In  the discus­
sion that follows reasons for growth in countries such as A ustralia 
will be discussed. B ut the m ain emphasis will be on the US. 
T he reason for this is th a t the US is a m ature capitalism . Rapidly 
developing countries such as A ustralia are likely to  meet some 
of the same economic problem s when they reach the  same level 
of development if they are based on a capitalist framework. Again 
the present m onetary crisis illustrates how conditions in the United 
States affect the rest of the capitalist world.
W hy have there been m uch higher levels of employment since 
the 1930’s? Developing countries such as A ustralia  are a special 
case. Here the off-setting factors are increased private investment 
and the growth of the government sector of the economy. M igration 
is a factor here. Overseas investment in A ustralia gives a short­
term  expansion e.g. in minerals, a t the cost of longer-term  disposal 
of assets to  overseas interests. In  a growing economy, growth 
encourages investment, and thus further growth. The re-equipping 
of the Japanese economy since 1950 has been a m ajor factor in 
its growth.
A  structural change from consum ption to  private investm ent is 
no t possible in a developed economy such as that of the  US. Thus 
gross private domestic investment was 15.7%  of the G N P in 1929; 
13.1%  in 1940 and 14.8%  in 1964 (Shapiro: Macroeconomic 
Analysis p. 123). In the US w hat has offset the growth of 
productive capacity in the last 30 years (associated as it has been 
w ith a decline in the propensity to  consume), has been the growth 
of government spending.
T hus government purchases of goods and services increased from 
8.2%  of G N P in 1929 to  22.7%  in 1969. T he m ain single factor 
in  this rise has been the increase in military spending from 0 .7%  
of G N P (1929) to 8 .8%  of G N P (1969). Lipsey estimates that if 
the US reduced its defence spending “over-night” to  1940 levels, 
then unemployment m ight rise as high as 25%  of the labor force.5 
Joan  Robinson develops the view expressed here when she says 
th a t “the effect of his (Keynes’) argum ent is to  explain why it is 
tha t modern capitalism  flourishes when governments are making 
investments in arm am ents.” In doing so they are creating dem and 
and employment. J. R obinson concludes: “The cure, m ost of us 
would agree, is even worse than the disease.”6
5 Lipsey: An Introduction to Positive Economics p. 659.
# J. Robinson: Collected Economic Papers. Vol. 2, p. 11-12.
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It follows that in the US the increased propensity to  save (implied 
in the reduced propensity to consume) has been offset mainly by 
governm ent investment in armaments. I t was not a change in 
thinking tow ards Keynesianism that ended the depressed years of 
the 1930’s. In the US the num ber of unem ployed was still 19% 
of the workforce in 1938. In 1944, after three years of war, 
the figure was only 1 .2% .7
THE US ECONOMY 1960-70
There were three quite distinct phases in the US economy in the 
1960’s.
1. 1958-64
M ilitary spending was very high in this period. F o r example it 
was $45,900,000,000 or 9 .3%  of the G N P in 1960, com pared 
with 0 .7%  in 1929. Despite this the period saw a sharp rise in 
unem ploym ent —  the num ber of unem ployed averaged 5 .8%  of 
the workforce, whereas in the preceding seven years the average 
num ber of unemployed was 3.6%  of the w orkforce8. This indicated 
that the problem  of selling the product was becoming more acute 
in the early 1960’s.
2. 1965-first half of 1969
The economic effects of US military spending in the period 
1965-69 are shown in the following table:
TA B L E  2: The US economy, 1960-69, some relevant figures.9
1960 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
Total unemployed 
(thousands) 3,852 3,360 2,857 2,975 2,817 2,746
(March)
Percentage unemployed 5.5 4.5 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.5
Defence expenditure 
$ thousand millions 46 50 57 70 80 81
Federal Budget Deficit 
$ thousand millions'® + 0 .2 — 1.6 — 3.8 — 8.8 — 25.2 — 2.9
Consumer Price Index 
(base 1957-59 =  100) 103.1 109.9 113.1 116.3 121.2 127.7
t  Samuelson: Economics p. 191. 
s Ibid. p. 191.
» Figures in  this table are from the Statistical Abstracts of the USA (1969 and 
1970) and Survey of Current Business (Oct. 1970). 
i« Surplus indicated by +  and deficit by — .
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T he cause of the accelerated rate of military spending from 1965 
was, of course, the w ar in V ietnam , which in 1968-69 accounted 
for about one-third of US m ilitary spending. Between 1965 and
1969 the num ber of US unem ployed declined by 614,000, despite 
an increase in the workforce. C orporate profits were $66,800,000,- 
000 in 1964 and $92,200,000,000 in 1968. Each year of the 
V ietnam  war has seen a budget deficit, as high as $25,200,000,000 
in 1968.
The transfer of resources to  war, financed in part by deficit 
budgeting, plus adm inistered prices, explains the sharp increase 
in inflation from the first year of the extended Vietnam  w ar to  
today. Thus, the C onsum er Price Index rose from 109.9 to  127.7 
in the four years 1965-69. Social problems m ounted in this period. 
Thus 26,100,000 US citizens are described as living in poverty 
in 1967 (13.4%  of the population), and an even larger num ber 
lived in near-poverty.11 Thus in 1967 one in four Am ericans lived 
in or near poverty.
3. M id-1969 to  present day
Signs of a recession appeared in the USA late in 1969. Central 
features are set ou t in the table below.
T A B L E  3. The US Econom y 1967-71
1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Total unemployed 
(thousands) 2,975 2,817 2,846
(Dec.)
5,146
(Dec.)
5,085
(Apr.)
Percentage unemployed 3.8 3.6 3.5 6.2
(Dec.)
6.1
(Apr.)
Defence expenditure 
S thousand millions 70 80 81 79 73
(est.)
Federal Budget Deficit 
$ thousand millions
— 8.8 — 25.2 — 2.9 — 22
(est.)
— 22
(est.)
Consumer Price Index _____ _ _ _ _ , „ . „
(base 1957-59 =  100) 116.3 121.2 128.7 136.0
(Aug.) (Aug.)
T he 1965-69 boom  was caused by the sharp rise in military 
spending, financed in part by deficit budgets. By m id-1969 the 
period of expansion of the US economy on this base had come 
to an end. There were two reasons for this. The V ietnam  wax
i i  Statistical Abstract of US 1969, p. 328.
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had led to  mounting inflation (see Table 3 above). There was a 
real fear that the US was heading towards a financial and economic 
crisis. This led to  restrictions on the rate  of increase in the money 
supply, credit restrictions and higher interest rates. M ore im port­
antly, the nature of the war and m ilitary defeats caused widespread 
hostility to  the level of military spending. In  1970 and 1971 there 
was some reduction in the level of m ilitary spending.
Table 3 shows tha t the economy soon moved into a recession 
with m ounting levels of unemployment. In  1970 real G N P actually 
declined, and figures for M ay 1971 (the latest available) showed 
unem ploym ent at 6 .2%  and inflation at an annual rate of 7.2% . 
In  the Monthly Review (April 1971) Sweezy estimates that in 
D ecem ber 1970, unemployed and those in defence-related 
em ploym ent came to  a total of 22 ,300,000 —  25.1%  of total 
labor force. Sweezy concludes that the figure of 25 .1%  is somewhat 
higher than the highest-ever officially recorded unemployment 
figure of 24.9%  in 1933. Because of the areas in  which spending 
has been reduced reports indicate that growing unemployment is 
no longer confined mainly to  unskilled workers, Negroes and youth. 
The rate of increase of unem ploym ent is m uch the same for black 
and white, skilled and unskilled workers.
The Australian Financial Review of April 14, 1971, writes that 
the Japanese economy is “ in search of a boost” and further: “We 
(the Japanese— Ed.) are caught in a genuine depression.” The 
possibility of this development was indicated in Table 1 (d) above 
which shows for Japan  a steady fall in the propensity to consume. 
The Japanese growth rate of 7%  is still high, but the recession 
has already led to  a scaling down in dem and for some A ustralian 
m inerals and short tim e for some Japanese workers in growth 
industries such as electronics.
TRENDS IN M ODERN CAPITALISM
In  the m ost highly-developed capitalist State —  the US —  the 
tendency of a modern capitalist State towards stagnation is quite 
clear. M ajor reasons are the growth of surplus and productive 
capacity on the one hand and the long-term  trend to  a fall in the 
propensity to  consume. The trend to  stagnation can be delayed for 
long periods. The development of new resources and industries in 
A ustralia, expansion of old industries, capital inflow and high 
rates of m igration have led to  a growth of the economy. These 
factors could not operate in a m ature economy such as tha t of the 
US, w here m ilitary spending has been the m ain factor in masking 
(to a degree) the trend tow ard stagnation.
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INTERNATIONAL M ONETARY - TRADE CRISIS
Since writing the above the m onetary-trade crisis in the United 
States has forced the Nixon Governm ent to announce a num ber 
of measures including a ten per cent surcharge on m ost imports 
and an end to  the US undertaking to  convert dollars into gold. 
Since 1945 there has been a vast expansion of trade between the 
capitalist countries, helped by the relative stability of the dollar 
which became the currency through which these countries have 
settled their debts. A ttem pts have been m ade to  reduce tariffs.
Thus the decisions of the Nixon adm inistration represent the end 
o f an era. The economic crisis in the U nited States has forced 
measures reminiscent of the exchange depreciation-high tariff policies 
of the 1930’s. The basic reason for the im port surcharge is that 
the m arket cannot absorb the vast volume of goods produced by 
US, Japan, the E E C  and other countries. Countries such as Japan 
and  West G erm any —  with more rapid rates of developm ent —  are 
eating into the Am erican market. The US m onetary crisis is made 
m ore severe by the w ar in V ietnam  and the attendant inflation 
plus the high levels of US investment overseas —  another drain 
on dollar reserves.
Total US reserve assets —  including gold —  were $13.5 billion 
in June 1971. The US balance of payments deficit was $10 billion 
in 1970 and at an annual ra te  of $23 billion in the first half of 
this year. In  these circum stances the m onetary-trade measures 
w ere inevitable. In  effect the US is pursuing the policy followed 
by the Japanese in the 1930’s —  exporting unem ploym ent. The 
im port quotas and forced revaluation of o ther currencies will give 
a short term  advantage to  the US at the expense of exports of 
countries such as Japan , W est G erm any and A ustralia. The 
m onetary-trade crisis is thus a  result of the deepening crisis of 
capitalism  seen in the growing problem  of finding m arkets, and 
V ietnam . Restrictions on trade reduce the volume of trade. They 
invite retaliation. F o r this reason the measures taken by the US 
will have the overall effect of deepening and widening the crisis 
of capitalism.
CONCLUSIONS
Since 1939 the economic contradictions of the US have been 
obscured prim arily by m ilitary spending; the contradictions have 
not been solved. W hat is happening in the US is not a trade cycle 
of the 19th century type. There can be fluctuations within the 
general fram ework of stagnation. T hat the basic trend is to 
stagnation is shown by the growth of unemployment before 1965
1!)
and since 1969. The USA is entering a new era. The economy 
can no longer rely on continued increases in m ilitary spending 
which in any case is contributing to instability. If President N ixon’s 
proposed visit to  China takes place, it will be difficult to m aintain 
the present level of military spending.
I t is often argued that m ilitary spending can be replaced by 
spending on education, health, slum clearance and anti-pollution 
measures. But to  see this transfer as a simple process is to  ignore 
the realities of the class nature of capitalist society. M ilitary 
spending is prom oted by the ruling US circles prim arily to  promote 
political ends. It is highly unlikely tha t these circles would have 
willingly consented to continued huge budget deficits and heavy 
taxation for ends such as slum clearance. Thinking in term s of 
their own narrow  interests, the great m onopolies see such things 
as education as a cost with no profit margin. G albraith  points out 
that the technology of industrial giants such as General Dynamics 
D uPont and General Electric is more suited to  weaponry and space 
research than to building hospitals.
The real answer to  the contradictions discussed is the complete 
overthrow  of the capitalist system, followed by a socialist society 
in which there will be workers’ (people’s) control and maximum 
individual and group initiative. In capitalist countries we must 
have a policy now linking the present with the socialist future. 
The first thing is to get popular realisation of the possibilities for 
“the quality of life” when m an controls m odern technology for 
hum an ends.
The crisis of capitalism  calls for bold policies now around 
questions such as education, environm ent, living standards, etc. It 
is in this context that the fight can be developed for workers’ control. 
Bold policies m ust lead to  action aim ed to  achieve them. The 
objective is not a more hum ane and efficient capitalism. If the 
left forces link the movement suggested w ith the need for revolu­
tionary change, then the grow th of the movem ent —  and the 
conflict with the predatory interests of capital —  will play a vital 
role in developing socialist consciousness.
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